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• Challenges in Cyber Security
• Important NPS capabilities
• Selected research activities
Irvine, 29 October 2009 NPS Cyber Security Summit 2
Cyberspace
• Internet is today’s core – many interdependencies









• Cyberspace: hierarchies of 
virtual and cyber-physical 
networks
– Range from tiny to large
• Many smart, small devices
– Highly interconnected
• Hybrid systems pervasive
– Sensor and control
Enormous Complexity
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
• Extensible Trustworthy Systems
• Cyber Identity
• Resilient Survivable Systems
• Information Provenance
• Measurement of Security
• Countering Insiders
• Ergonomic Security – Usability
• Balance security and privacy
• Better Methods to Construct & Assess Secure Systems
• Economic Security –reuse and composition
• Human Capacity
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Extensible Trustworthy Systems
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Single flaw can topple
entire system. Building blocks for which we have high 
confidence are needed
Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Cyber Identity: Who and what am I talking to?
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– In worst case:
fail secure
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Information Provenance
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Real Fake
Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Measurement of Security
• We need to be able to quantify security
– Technically, to enable system construction
– So that decision makers can weigh risks
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Countering Insiders
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
• Ergonomic Security – Usability
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Cyber security hygiene must be understandable and easy to use. 
Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Balance security and privacy
These are sometimes conflicting objectives
Can information be authentic yet anonymous?
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Better Methods to Construct & Assess Secure Systems
Current tools for constructing
secure systems are often inadequate
and difficult to use.
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Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Economic Security 
Reuse and composition of components
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Do we have to boil the ocean 
yet again each time we build a 
secure system?
Cyber Security Grand Challenges
Human Capacity
• The need for talent
at all levels is 
critical
• Education must be
a high priority
• Our competiveness in a
globalized economy depends
on it.
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Huge Benefits / Huge Risks
• Cyber security is enabling technology.





• Crime: extortion, theft
• Disruption, usurpation
• Propaganda, disinformation
Many risks today – adversaries have the upper hand
Need to change the balance
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Overview
• Challenges in Cyber Security
• Important NPS capabilities
– CISR
– Educational Programs
• Selected research activities
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In the NPS Computer Science Department, 
we do it.
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Cyber Security
… and we have been doing it well 
for a long time (1978)




















– Courses & Curricula
– Certificates
– Games & Outreach
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Center for Information Systems Security 
Studies and Research
• CISR established in 1996
• Began national security education outreach in 1997
• Center of Academic Excellence
– NSA and DHS joint award
– Information Assurance Education
– Information Assurance Research
• Scholarship Programs
– IASP in cyber security for military officers
– Inaugural participant NSF Scholarship for Service
• 60 graduates to date – civilian members of Federal workforce
• Monarch – to encourage women and underrepresented groups
• Synergistic research and education
– Large research group with critical mass for hard problems
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Educational Programs
• MS and PhD degrees
• All MS students take introduction to computer security
• Security track in CS Department




– Identity Management Certificate
• 4 courses
• “Hybrid” format 
– Participants work at their regular jobs while taking classes
– Information Systems Security Engineering Certificate
• Currently teaching to students at NSA
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Courses: Elementary to Advanced
• Introduction to Computer 
Security§
• Secure Management of 
Systems*
• Network Security*✓
• Secure Systems Principles*✓
• Security Policies Models and 
Formal Methods*
• Cyber Ethics and Policies




*     Security Track Required
✓ Information Systems Security Engineering 
Certificate
 Identity Management Certificate 
(joint with two IS courses)
• Identity Management 
Infrastructure
• Protocol Analysis
• Introduction to Information 
System Security 
Engineering✓
• Applied Information System 
Security Engineering✓
• Secure Systems Lifecycle
• Wireless Security




• Certification and Accreditation
• Advanced topics
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• Challenges in Cyber Security
• Important NPS capabilities
• Selected research activities
– Trusted Computing Exemplar
– Trustworthy Architectures
– Multilevel Security
– Cyber Security Game
– Hardware Security
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Trusted Computing Exemplar Project
28
Address Subversion - Limit Opportunity
• Need lifecycle assurance
– High assurance
– Protection via rigorous security engineering
• No unspecified functionality
• Use of formal verification techniques
– When Applied in MLS Context:
• Bound information flow 
– Prevents Trojan Horse damage
• Uses formal models 
– Supports implementation assessment
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TCX Integrated Activities
• Rapid High Assurance Development Framework
– Configuration Management, Engineering Process, …
– Semantic programming-based documentation system
• Develop High Assurance Security Concepts
– Separation Kernel - EAL7
• Many student research projects
– High Assurance Application
• Authentication Device for MLS Trusted Path
• Evaluate Components for High Assurance
– Developing EAL6+ Separation Kernel Protection Profile
• ST will be EAL7
• Disseminate Results via Open Methodology
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• Evaluatable Reference Implementation
• Components with a priori Assurance Against System 
Subversion
• Public Availability of High Assurance Development 
Framework
• Transfer to Next Generation
– New Experts in Security Development
– High Assurance Knowledge 
and Capabilities
TCX Benefits
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Trustworthy Architectures
emergency access to critical data
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• Most of the time Joe is an ordinary guy
• During emergencies, he is allowed to access critical information
• Extraordinary information cannot be leaked to the internet
• When emergency ends, collected information sent to emergency management
• Device is purged of emergency information, reset for next emergency
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Emergency Access to Critical Data
Key Concepts
• Based on Least Privilege Separation Kernel
– Ensures separation of normal and emergency information
– Permits emergency activities to access selected “normal” data
• Extraordinary access mediated by high assurance 
enforcement mechanism
– Gives cooperating organizations confidence that shared 
information is protected
• Trusted path mechanism
– Receives initial emergency signal
– Insures that only authorized first responders have access to 
emergency information
• Provides ergonomic security
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Multilevel Security
Networks that cannot share
• National policies information protection must be enforced
– Separate networks for each classification level
• Internet / NIPRNET / SIPRNET / JWICS
– Some communities require
mandatory separation of compartments
– Coalitions result in additional networks
Problem: No coherent view of classified information
• Requirements
– Secure - enforce national policies
– Usable - support applications that make users productive
– Scalable - extensible beyond small laboratory experiments
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Our Solution: MYSEA
• The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA)
• High assurance multilevel LAN/WAN architecture
– Many commodity components
• Commercial off-the shelf workstations, OS and applications
• Legacy single-level networks
– Reduce system footprint – one PC, many classification levels
– Strategic high assurance components
• Policy decision and enforcement 
• Prototype implementation and integrated MLS testbed
Irvine, 29 October 2009 36NPS Cyber Security Summit
A high assurance client-server system that allows authenticated 
users executing popular commercial applications to securely access 
data and services at different classification levels simultaneously



















































































MYSEA High Assurance Component
GOTS Component
Irvine, 29 October 2009
• Technical elements
– Familiar user work environment 
– Integration of MLS LAN with classified networks
– Centralized security management
– Dynamic security policies and services
– True multilevel access to data 
– Single sign-on within the MLS LAN
– Server replication supports scalability
– High assurance trusted path
SUMMARY
MYSEA gives users coherent view of information at different 
classifications levels
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MYSEA Security Features
CyberCIEGE
a cyber security game













Player = Information Security Decision Maker


































Trustworthy System Security 


































Goal: Build trustworthy systems using 
commercial hardware components
Problem: Integrating specialized security 
mechanisms is too costly for hardware 
vendors
Idea: Augment commodity hardware after 
fabrication with a separate layer of security 
circuitry 
Anticipated Benefits: 
Configurable, protected, low-cost hardware 
security controls that can override activity in 
the commodity hardware
Privacy Applications:
Detect and intercept the execution of 
malicious code
Prevent the microprocessor internals from 
being exploited to leak crypto keys
Tag and Track private information as it flows 
through a processor
Summary
• Challenges in Cyber Security
• Important NPS capabilities
• Selected research activities
NPS resources in CISR and the Department of Computer 
Science are among best in the world for the 
study and advancement of 
Cyber Security.
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